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NOTES

A cursory consideration of the right of secession of the United States from
the United Nations might lead one to believe that a complication would result
from the fact that the United Nations maintains its headquarters in the United
States. However, this situation presents no problem as the following analogy will
illustrate.
The embassy or legation in the United States of a foreign power is indeed
considered in contemplation of the law as part of the sovereign jurisdiction of
the homeland of the represented foreign power. But should the United States
sever diplomatic relations with such foreign power, the foregoing condition ceases
to exist.
Should the United States secede from the United Nations the idea of the
employment of force by the other member nations to frustrate such action is remote
for both legal and practical reasons. Professors Goodrich and Hambro in their
book wrote that: "If the action is thought to be unjustified by the remaining members, no action will or can be taken to prevent it."6 The United States, unlike
the Confederate States ninety-one years ago, is the dominant military power in
the world today and, therefore, in a position to make good such secession and to
uphold its legal right.

AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION; TWO MORE PROBLEMS
(1) ARE THEIR REJECTIONS BINDING?
By
FRANCIS L. DAILY*

(Editor's Note-Whether or not the suggested limitation of federal taxation
of income becomes part of the Constitution might well be decided by answers to
two vital questions of Constitutional law. In the OctobLer issue of this volume,
57 Dick. L. Rev. 86 Frank E. Packard discussed the first, i.e., whether the states
could rescind resolutions memorializing Congress to propose such an amend 2
ment. The author here considers the second problem, i.e., whether state legislatures are bound by their prior rejections of the resolution.)
Probably almost 'everyone by now has heard of the movement to amend the
Constitution of the United States so as to limit federal income tax rates to a maximum of twenty-five per cent in peacetime, by causing state legislatures to adopt
resolutions memorializing the Congress to call a convention for the purpose of
proposing such an amendment.
6 Goodrich, Professor Leland M. and Professor Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United NationsCommentary and Documents, World Peace Foundation, Boston, p. 145 (1949).
* Senior partner of the Chicago law firm of Daily, Dines, Ross and O'Keefe.
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Article V of the Constitution provides for such a convention when the legislatures of two-thirds of the states request it. To date twenty-eight state General
Assemblies have passed resolutions to this effect, four short of the required twothirds, or~thirty-two.
However, since one or both Houses of several state legislatures have rejected
such resolutions, the question arises whether the four resolutions still needed
may be obtained from the twenty states which have not adopted such a resolution,
cr whether the choice is limited to those states which have neither adopted nor
rejected the resolution. The latter alternative, if it were le',ally sound, would halve
the number of states that could possibly approve the resolution.
It is submitted that, although a state general assembly which ratifies a proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States or which adopts a
resolution memorializing the Congress to call a convention for the purpose of
proposing an amendment to the Constitution cannot retract such affirmative
action,la nevertheless a state legislature which affirmatively declines to ratify a
proposed amendment, or, similarly, affirmatively rejects a resolution memorializing the Congress to call a convention for the purpose of proposing an amendment, is not precluded from subsequently ratifying the amendment or adopting
the memorializing resolution, respectively.
Since all of the existing twenty-two amendments to the Constitution of the
United States have been initiated by proposal of Congress and since the Constitution has no express provision on the rule urged here, the method of reasoning
which is available to prove the foregoing proposition must be that of analogy.
The analogy can be drawn with the following rule:
That affirmative refusal by a state to ratify an amendment proposed by the
Congress does not preclude later ratification.
Distinguished legal scholars, as well as the courts, have announced the latter
rule. Professor Justin Miller of the School of Law of the University of Minnesota, writing in the Minnesota Law Review, stated that:
if a state rejects the proposed amendment it may thereafter
change its vote and ratify ... .The fact that, after all, the negative
votes of only thirteen states, regardless of size, population or importance
can defeat the will of all the rest of them would seem to go a long way
toward justifying the present rule that a vote can be changed from rejection to ratification.. .
judge John Alexander Jameson, in his textbook entitled A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions; Their History, Powers and Modes of Proceeding, stated
that:
la See 57 Dick. L. Rev. 86 (1952).

1 Miller, Professor Justin, "Amendment of the Federal Constitution: Should It Be Made More
Difficult?" 10 Minn. L. Rev. 185, 188 (1926).

NOTES

"... the right of a (s) tate legislature, after a negative vote has once
been passed, to recede from it and ratify an amen ment, is, we think,
upon principle, unquestionable."-2
The Supreme Court of Kansas in 1937 in its opinion in the case of Coleman
v. Miller3 said:
"It is generally agreed by lawyers, statesmen and publicists who have
debated this question that a state legislature which has rejected an amendment proposed by Congress may later reconsider its action and give its approval, but that a ratification once given cannot be withdrawn."
Of the decision by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Coleman v. Miller, Professor Lester Bernhardt Orfield wrote in his textbook entitled The Amending of
the Federal Constitution as follows:
"The Kansas view is supported by Congressional practice as to
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and by the legal theory
that the Constitution creates only a power to ratify and not a power to reject. It is also supported on the ground of public policy in that less delay
results and that it is less confusing than counting subsequent reversals.
To allow a 4rejection to be final is to make the amending process less
deliberate."
Two years after the Kansas decision the Supreme Court of the United States
in an opinion in the same case said:
"The state court adopted the view expressed by textwriters that
a state legislature which has rejected an amendment proposed by the
Congress may later ratify. The argument in support of that view is that
Article V says nothing of a rejection but speaks only of ratification and
provides that a proposed amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution when ratified by three-fourths of the (s)tates; that the power
to ratify is thus conferred upon the (s) tate by the Constitution, and,
as a ratifying power, persists despite a previous rejection. .

.

. The pre-

cise question as now raised is whether, when the legislature of the
(s) tate, as we have found, has actually ratified the proposed amendment,
the (c)ourt should restrain the state officers from certifying the ratification to the Secretary of State, because of an earlier rejection, and thus
prevent the question from coming before the political departments. We
find no basis in either Constitution or statute for such judicial action.
Article V speaking solely of ratification, contains no promise as to rejection. Nor has the Congress enacted a statute relating to rejections." 6
2 Jameson, Judge John Alexander, "A Treatise on Constitutional Conventions; Their History,
Powers, and Modes of Proceeding," Callaghan and Company, Chicago, 628. ( 18 8 7 ). The following authorities reach the same conclusion. 26 Georgetown L. Journ. 98, 107, 114 (1937); Garrett, Professor Finis J., "Amending the Federal Constitution," 7 Tenn. L. Rev. 286, 304 (1929);
Willoughby, Professor Westel Woodbury, "The Constitutional Law of the United States," Baker,
Voorhis and Co., N.Y., 593 (1929).
8 146 Kan. 390,.400, 71 P.2d 518, 524 (1937).
4 Orfield, Professor Lester Bernhardt, "The Amending of the Federal Constitution," The Uni-

versity of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 70, 71 (1942).
5 307 U.S. 433, 447, 450, 59 S. Ct. 972, 979, 980 (1939).
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Concerning the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Coleman v. Miller, Professor Orfield wrote as follows:
"Itwould seem to follow from the recent decision of the Supreme
Court that the fact of rejection by more than one-fourth of the states does
not bar ultimate ratification of an amendment if Congress deems the
amendment still open for ratification . . .Since rejection by a single

state was not conclusive, it logically followed that rejection by a group
of states carried no greater weight. Thus the fact that twenty-one states
had rejected the child labor amendment and notified the Secretary of
State, and four states had rejected without such notice did not destroy
the amendment. That the present Article V does not allow rejection by
one-fourth of the states plus one to defeat the amendment permanently
was to some extent indicated by the Wadsworth-Garrett Joint Resolution
in 1926 proposing an amendment which would expressly permit onefourth of the states plus one to kill the amendment. In the case of the
Fourteenth Amendment, ten states out of thirty-seven, or more than onefourth, had rejected, yet Congress treated it as ratified. Thus the prevailing view seems to be that a rejection is not final . ...6
Likewise, Professor Walter F. Dodd, writing in the Yale Law Journal, said:
".. it is perhaps dear that a state legislature has a continuing power of ratification until an amendment is adopted, or until such a long
period has elapsed that a sort of statute of limitations may be said to
have run against any power to ratify the proposal. It may be remembered
that the power in the state legislature is one derived from the federal Constitution, and is a power to ratify, not a power to reject. If a (C) onstitutional amendment is proposed, one state legislative session may not by
explicitly rejecting prevent the further exercise of the federal power conferred upon the state legislature. Rejection by a state legislature is in this
respect equivalent to the negative result arising from state legislative inaction. There is no power in and of itself to reject a federal (C)onstitutional amendment, and failure to act by one-fourth of the states is sufficient. In the case of the Thirteenth Amendment, New Jersey first rejected the amendment and then ratified. In the case of the Fourteenth
Amendment, four states (North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and
Virginia) rejected and then ratified. In the case of the Fifteenth Amendment, Ohio and New Jersey rejected and then ratified. In all of these
cases, where the action was taken previoug to the issuance of the proclamation that an amendment had been adopted,
the states were included
by the Secretary of State as ratifying." 7

8 Orfield, Professor Bernhardt, "The Amending of the Federal Constitution," The University of
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1942, pp. 72, 73. Professor Hugh Evander Willis in "The
Doctrine of the Amendability of the United States Constitution," 7 Ind. L. Journ. 457, 461 (1932),
states for his reason in arriving at the same conclusion that "the Constitution mentions only ratification and not rejection."
7 Dodd, Professor Walter F., "Amending the Federal Constitution," 30 Yale L. J. 321, 347
(1940). Other articles dealing with the subject which recognize the same argument are 11 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 472, 473 (1938) and 24 Minn. L. Rev. 393, 395, 396 (1940).

NOTES

Conclusion
It is apparent from what is said above that there exists a very respectable
body of authoritative opinion by scholars who have addressed themselves to the
subject which supports and, under the circumstances, in effect establishes the
proposition that a state legislature may, after actively rejecting a proposed amendment, later validly ratify it. The dear logic upon which this proposition is based is
that a state, when acting with respect to the federal Constitution, is not acting as
an independent and sovereign power, but under powers granted to it or created
in it by Article V of the United States Constitution itslf. That article provides on
this subject that Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses deem it necessary,
shall propose amendments to the Constitution which shall be valid when ratified by the legislatures of or by conventions in three-fourths of the states. It will
be seen that the Constitution authorizes ratification only, and makes no mention of rejection; and this circumstance was cited by the United States Supreme
Court in Coleman v. Miller in the language quoted above, as the controlling one.
The same logic applies directly to the other part of Article V, which provides that Congress shall, on the application' of the legislatures of two-thirds of
the states, call a convention for proposing amendments. A state presumably makes
a Constitutional "application" when it adopts a resolution requesting Congress
to take the desired action. There is nothing in Article V which authorizes a state,
after it has made such an application, to cancel it or withdraw it. Whatever may
be the power of a state acting as a sovereign to undo any action previously taken,
the state in this instance is not acting as a sovereign, but as a branch of the federal
union; and what it may validly do with respect to a Constitutional amendment is
what the Constitution itself provides that it may do-that, and nothing more.
The inescapable conclusion is that the action of any state legislature which
has heretofore purported to reject the present resolution calling for a convention
to propose an amendment to limit the rate of income taxes is a nullity, and that
the additional legislatures required to make up the two-thirds of the forty-eight
states contemplated by Article V may come from among any or all of the legislatures which have not heretofore adopted the resolution, including those which
have purported to reject it.

